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ABSTRACT 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is employed by the 
United States Navy (USN) to allow combat naval systems to 
share combat resources, collectively gather and distribute 
intelligence data and generate superior air pictures for 
effective and efficient engagement against air threats with 
high precision, timeliness and accuracy using existing 
radar or weapon systems.  
CEC has yet to be employed on any land combat systems. 
This thesis discusses possible employment of CEC on land 
combat systems based on a combat operational profile. 
Simulation analysis on a land-based anti-air defense 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is a capability 
that integrates all data gathering/sensor resources to 
track and transmit critical information to all connected 
platforms, thereby generating a common Situation Awareness 
(SA) picture. Other than providing a common SA picture, CEC 
allows increased accuracy and timeliness of time-critical 
data such as incoming enemy missiles; this allows an 
appropriate weapon system to effectively destroy the 
threat. With time being a critical factor in such 
operations, it is vital to minimize delays resulting from 
Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loops. The solution seems 
to be a large number of units networking as a single, 
distributed and defensive/offensive system. This CEC 
concept has been developed since the early 1970s, with live 
firing completed on June 2004 (Hopkins, 1995).  
However, CEC has not been employed in land combat 
systems. Despite several distinct differences between land 
combat forces and naval combat forces, there are several 
operations where land combat forces could leverage the 
capabilities of CEC to increase offensive and defensive 
capabilities. One such area is anti-air defense systems. 
This thesis studies the potential use of CEC in land 
systems. Back of Envelope (BOE), ExtendSim simulations 
using Taguchi design were performed on three types of air 
threats: (1) mortar bombs, (2) artillery shells and (3) 
rockets fired against an anti-air defense system consisting 
of radar and anti-air weapon. From the results, it was 
noted that the implementation of CEC would be more 
 xvi 
effective in anti-air defense against artillery shells and 
mortar bombs. For that reason, rockets will not be tested 
in ExtendSim. Also, from the results of the BOE as well as 
the need to test the CEC capabilities on land combat 
forces, four control variables were identified:  (1) 
detection range, (2) maximum engagement range, (3) process 
time and the (4) number of concurrent air targets that the 
anti-air weapon system can engage at one time. The two 
noise variables are fired range and rate of fire of the air 
threats. With four levels of control variables and two 
levels of noise levels, a total of 320 simulation runs were 
performed. The mean plots for both mortar bombs and 
artillery shells are shown in this thesis. 
From the simulation results, it is noted that process 
time is key to the success rate of intercepting incoming 
air threats. Process time refers to the rate of information 
transfer between the weapon location radar (TPQ) and anti-
air weapon. This includes the data processing at the TPQ, 
analysis by the TPQ commander, data transfer (either wired 
or wireless) between the TPQ and anti-air weapon, decision 
making by the Division/Brigade commander and execution by 
the anti-air weapon commander.  
Other factors such as detection range, maximum 
engagement range and number of concurrent targets to be 
engaged were determined to have little influence on the 
interception rate of the air threats. Nonetheless, the 
interception rate is also much dependent on the rate of 
fire and range of the air threats. The interception rate of 
rockets is noted to be high due to the long range from 
which they are fired, which increases the anti-air 
 xvii 
engagement window and small quantity of the rockets fired 
upon a target. Air threats from artillery and mortars pose 
potential threats to the land targets and limit the anti-
air engagement window. Taguchi analysis shows mortar bombs 
to be the most dangerous threat, as the maximum 
interception rate was only about 83%.  
In conclusion, land combat forces can employ CEC to 
increase SA among the troops, increase interception rate 
and reduce process time.  However, the implementation of 
CEC on land systems cannot be taken wholesale from the CEC 
structure used in the U.S. Navy (USN) due to the 
differences in threats, operations, platforms and cost of 
CEC equipment and implementation. Thus, it is recommended 
to implement relevant functions of CEC by focusing on 
adjusting the network connectivity structure and rapid data 
processing rate of CEC to suit the needs of the land combat 
forces. These needs include the reduction of process time, 
increased interception rate of incoming air threats and, 
lastly, reduction of cost. Exploration of doctrinal changes 
to reduce OODA loop delay time should also be continued. 
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A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
1. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 
Warfare has never been so complex, having budding 
relations with social economics, emergence of information 
technology and powerful dynamics of business processes and 
organizations. The expertise generated in these areas helps 
to formulate better warfare fighting concepts with three 
changes: (1) a shift in focus from the platform to the 
network, (2) priority on integration between humans and 
systems and (3) a more strategic perspective that adapts 
and survives in a changing environment and context. 
Essentially, these changes propel the evolution of 
platform-centric warfare to network-centric warfare (NCW), 
which allows our forces to develop speed of command. 
Information superiority with better awareness is one of the 
key advantages of speed of command. However, achieving this 
advantage of speed of command requires superior sensors, 
powerful networks and display technology (Cebrowski, 1998). 
CEC leverages the concept of NCW and speed of command 
to optimize combat power against threats by (1) pooling 
multiple existing sensor resources to increase track 
accuracy and sensor range, (2) upgrading networks and 
displays for real-time information transfers, and (3) 
establishing a common combat picture (Stein, 1998).  
Since the employment of CEC in the USN is technically 
effective through the use of superior situation awareness 
(SA), as well as NCW, combined combat power and speed of 
command are keys to obtain precise, timely and accurate 
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threat information to counter air threats. However, are 
these concepts and employment of CEC applicable for Land 
systems? Will CEC be as effective on land systems as it is 
on naval systems? 
2. Decision Making Time 
One of the key activities of CEC is the target 
engagement process. This process requires a target to be 
detected and identified by sensors (radars, human 
intelligence, Unmanned Reconnaissance Vehicles, etc.). Once 
the sensors have obtained the target’s location, engagement 
weapons will be selected to engage the target. The target 
engagement process relies heavily on the Command and 
Control (C&C) structure as it is an iterative and critical 
process of decision-making, and is time consuming due to 
the need to observe, orient and process a variety of 
conditions and information (validity and accuracy of 
information, engagement resources, time available to 
engage, consequences of engagement and not engaging, Rules 
of Engagement, safety of own forces, engagement 
authorization, etc.) logically by a computer and rationally 
by a commander before making a decision.  The target 
engagement decision-making process is commonly known as the 
Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop, developed by Boyd 
(1987). 
The OODA loop was often used to describe a decision 
maker’s process in a generic situation. In order to present 
a more representative model of various forms of combat, a 
modified OODA loop was created (Figure 1). This includes 
various factors that influence the orientation of the 
decision maker, creating multiple loops. OODA models have 
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been constantly analyzed and evolved in a cybernetic 
approach on C&C. After various developments, examples such 
as Lawson’s model and Wohl’s model were introduced. Common 
to these models was the conclusion that time is the 
dominant concern in warfare (Brehmer, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Boyd’s OODA loop (From: Boyd, 1996) 
One possible framework that could encapsulate the OODA 
loop is the integration framework.  
 
 
Figure 2.   OODA loop using integration framework (From: 
Langford, 2012) 
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In the processes domain, abstractions, mechanisms and 
models can be represented by observe, orient and decide of 
the OODA loop, respectively. The act of the OODA loop is 
essentially the interaction of the objects, which is on the 
objects domain of the integration framework. In a scenario 
where a commander is tasked to engage a target, he would 
envision how the task would be accomplished.  The commander 
would observe and expect that the target is armed, know the 
functions that he needs (e.g., to shoot or call for fire) 
and identify the type of hardware (equipment such as rifle) 
and software (soft tools such as communications network) 
required to accomplish the mission, and these are indicated 
in box 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Upon the completion of the 
observe/abstractions column, the commander shifts to the 
next column (box 4, 5 and 6), orient/mechanism where he 
establishes procedures in the objects domain to follow in 
order to align to the observe/abstractions column. Lastly, 
he would act (engage the target) based on the realization 
of the integration of preplanned and established behaviors, 




Figure 3.   Sources of delay in dynamic decision loop (From: 
Brehmer, 2005) 
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However, reducing the delays in the dynamic OODA loop 
is just one of the factors for winning wars in military 
warfare.  Another approach would be to disrupt the enemy’s 
dynamic OODA loop by increasing their decision-making time, 
reducing their certainty of what is observed (such as 
unsound tactical maneuvers), or displaying activities that 
are unforeseen (such as deception). Operating “inside” an 
opponent’s OODA loop means acting quickly to outthink, to 
outmaneuver, to use the situation to your advantage, and to 
exploit the opponent’s weaknesses. Whether by reducing 
delays or disrupting decision-making, time is a dominant 
concern in military warfare (Brehmer, 2005). With 
references to military theory and concepts, the dynamic 
OODA loop (Figure 4) was developed to capture the condition 
of ‘system shock’ (i.e., acting fast and decisively in 
order to win wars). 
 
 
Figure 4.   Dynamic OODA loop (From: Brehmer, 2005) 
Through this understanding of the OODA loop 
development of the decision-making process in various 
models, it is key for decision makers to have more time to 
process the chunks of information gathered, rationally 
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assess the overall situation, build SA, issue commands and 
allocate time for their execution. However, this luxurious 
warfare attribute is seldom achievable in reality due to 
the scale and complexity of modern warfare, cluttered 
combat zones, unforeseen situations, and time-critical 
events as well as overload of unfiltered information. 
However, the quest for time advantage by shortening the 
delays could affect the quality of the decision; thus, one 
may use that time advantage to increase the decision-making 
process time instead (Brehmer, 2004). 
b. Quality of Information 
The OODA loop described the process of decision-
making; however, the quality of decision made is the final 
output and will ultimately and directly affect the 
outcomes.  
Making a quality decision requires a chain of 
links/inputs (Figure 5). These inputs can be categorized as 
(1) knowledge (inputs 1-3), (2) perspective (input 4), (3) 




Figure 5.   Six elements of decision quality (From: Spetzler, 
2007) 
The knowledge required for a quality strategic 
decision requires a conscious effort to establish both a 
defined scope and a clear purpose for a team of decision 
makers from various backgrounds, who are able to explore 
various possibilities and alternatives from information 
that is reliable and accurate.  Through the generation of 
alternatives, trade-off analysis must be performed for the 
various perspectives to be aligned. These perspectives 
represent the principles and fundamental values of the 
organization that is making the decision. It is with the 
consideration of knowledge and perspective that a logical 
reasoning can be made. However, it is the commitment from 
all involved parties to implement the decision that 
significantly influences that decision’s ultimate quality. 
Thus, the quality of the decision does not lie with the 
decision maker alone, but also with his team and involved 
members. Therefore, the quality of decision is only as good 
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as the weakest link. If there is no meaningful and reliable 
information, the quality of decision could be as good as 
anyone’s guess (Edwards, Miles, & Von, 2007).  
From the earlier discussion, time and the quality 
of decision are undeniably important in time-critical 
situations. The employment of CEC in the USN embraces the 
concept of OODA by reducing delays to gain time through the 
target-engagement process, which includes the decision–
making process. Will time be equally important in the land 
combat environment as it is at sea, when CEC is employed in 
time-constrained situations? Does the time gained from 
employing CEC provide the land combat forces with a better 
chance of winning? 
3. The Goal 
The goal of this thesis is to accomplish four tasks. 
First, study the concept of CEC. This research will 
identify key capabilities that are employed by the USN in 
its operations. Second, analyze how land combat forces 
could employ CEC in their operations. Third, conduct 
simulation analysis on land combat operations using CEC to 
determine the importance of time and benefits of employing 
CEC. Fourth, provide recommendation of the feasibility of 
employing CEC in land combat forces with suggestions for 
further analysis and research.  
4. Thesis Organization 
This thesis consists of six chapters. 
Chapter I describes the problem and establishes 
specific goals for this thesis.  
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Chapter II studies the benefits of employing CEC. It 
explains in detail the CEC capabilities. 
Chapter III analyzes the effect of employment of CEC 
on land systems through the study of the operating 
environment, followed by possible land operations that 
would benefit from the capabilities of CEC. 
Chapter IV introduces the tools that would be used in 
the simulations. This sets the framework for the analysis 
of the results in the following chapter.  
Chapter V presents the simulation results as well as 
analyzing the simulation scenario of land combat forces 
operations employing CEC.  
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with possible areas 
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II. EVOLUTION OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
A. COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY (CEC) 
1. Employment of CEC in the USN 
CEC has been developed and tested for the USN, by 
Raytheon, since the 1980s. This capability allows combat 
systems (essentially Carrier Battle Groups (CBG)) “to share 
sensor, decision, and engagement data among combatant units 
without compromising timeliness, volume and accuracy of 
data” (Hopkins, 1995). 
This integration of CEC is primarily used to deter and 
deny any air threats such as fighters and anti-ship 
missiles from interrupting naval operations and/or their 
survival. Other than the physical network of the forces, 
communication linkages between these forces allows the 
naval forces to fight as a complete navy combat entity 
rather than individual land combat sectors (Figure 6). 
Thus, with CEC these ships in a CBG have gained various 




Figure 6.   The littoral environment (From: Hopkins, 1995) 
2. Capabilities Enhancement by CEC 
(1) Higher SA. The navy ships as well as their allies 
are equipped with ‘eyes’ over a larger operating area, 
collecting and sharing vital and time-critical information 
with one another. By connecting to the sensor resources 
from land (Firefinder Radar) and air (E-2C Hawkeye), the 
CBG will be apprised of any potential air threats in their 
operating environment. They are also able to gain an edge 
in detection time by focusing their radar beams towards the 
direction of the potential air threats.  
(2) Precise, accurate, and identical pictures of the 
air threats are derived from sensor data from various nodes 
of a network-centric engagement. With at least two ships 
tracking a common air threat, these ships communicate and 
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share real-time information within the CEC network to 
‘stitch’ up the tracks from various ships and form a 
comprehensive picture (Figure 7).  In the event that a ship 
is tracking an air threat alone, that ship can initiate a 
collective scanning, tracking and data enhancement of the 
threat by sending the threat information to another ship. 
This initiation is also known as precision cueing (Hopkins, 
1995). 
 
Figure 7.   Composite tracking and identification, precision 
cueing (From: Hopkins, 1995) 
 (3) Ability to engage a common air threat efficiently 
and effectively as a group. 
With the precise tracks of the air threats, the 
engagement process for this air threat among the multiple 
shooters within the CBG allows one primary ship to engage 
the air threat while other ships maintain their continuous 
feeding of tracks to the CEC network. Through this 
networked information distribution, any ship can be 
commanded via the fleet commander or automatically by the 
network control unit to engage the air threat without 
directly tracking the threat. For the network control unit 
to operate automatically, a set of doctrines is required to 
be loaded prior to the operation of the CEC. The automated 
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generation of engagement command reduces the need for every 
ship to initiate the engagement process and counter the air 
threats based in every scenario.  
However, the real-time CEC process requires fast 
processing and complex architecture. A snapshot of the CEC 
functional allocation is shown in Figure 9. There are three 
subsystems: the (1) Data Distribution System (DDS), which 
handles the transfer of data through the phased array 
antenna, (2) Cooperative Engagement Processor, which 
consists of 30 commercial microprocessors to perform 
critical functions such as track filtering and sensor 
interfacing, and (3) modified weapons system, which 
consists of add-ons to the existing components on-board the 
ships.  
 





Figure 9.   CEC physical components (From: Hopkins, 1995) 
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III. STUDY OF CEC ON LAND SYSTEMS 
A. LAND SYSTEMS 
1. Command and Control (C&C)  
NATO defined C&C as Military Function 01: “The 
organisation, process, procedures and systems necessary to 
allow timely political and military decision-making and to 
enable military commanders to direct and control military 
forces” (NATO, 1996). In addition, a C&C system is defined 
to include: headquarters facilities, information systems, 
sensors and warning installations, and communications 
(NATO, 1998). 
C&C is part of a functional decomposition of another 
function: ‘to manage’ (Langford, 2012). 
 
Figure 10.   Functional decomposition of the functions ‘to 
manage’ and ‘to command’ (From: Langford, 2012) 
Command and control are two separate functions and 
work alongside other functions such as ‘to plan’ and ‘to 
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organize’. Managing is akin to leading subjects under one’s 
authority to meet the objective.  
‘To command’ is to perform the art of assigning 
missions; providing resources (analyze, 
prioritize); directing subordinates (guide, set 
policy, focus the force to accomplish clear 
objectives); analyze risk (identify, assess). ‘to 
control’ is to define limits; negotiate; deal 
with constraints; determine requirements; 
allocate resources; report; maintain performance 
(monitor, identify, correct deviations from 
guidance). (Langford, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 11.   Functional decomposition of ‘to control’(From: 
Langford, 2012) 
As can be seen by the functional decomposition, C&C 
are very different, and often different people perform 
these two functions. The one that performs ‘to command’ 
usually shoulders higher responsibility and authority while 
everyone along the chain will have to perform ‘to control,’ 
whether it is over an individual or others. 

















2. CEC C&C 
The C&C structure in the USN’s CEC is rather 
simplistically complex. Every ship shares the same 
responsibility of maintaining self-defense, initiating 
requests and also responding to requests, as well as 
sharing responsibility in tracking and engaging the 
targets. As such, the C&C is dynamic and situation-
dependent. In terms of engaging the targets, these 
activities can be coordinated conventionally via command 
channels or cooperatively via CEC with the activation of a 
coordination doctrine by the designated Network Control 
Unit, used to establish a common set of doctrines, for 
automated engagement recommendations based on force-level 
engagement calculations. 
3. Defense Organization C&C 
CEC is used to counter air threats effectively within 
the USN CBG. CEC also allows optimization of combat powers 
to extend radar-scanning range, track with higher accuracy 
and engage targets efficiently. In short, CEC allows the 
fast sharing of critical information within a group and 
optimizing this time and information advantage to counter 
the threats/enemies.   
For land systems, one of the operational areas that 
could employ CEC is the air defense mission, intercepting 
any incoming projectiles such as rockets, artillery, and 
mortars. In general, the land air defense mission employs 
the same CEC concept as the USN CBG: scanning, tracking and 
engaging air threats. Using the Army C&C system as a 
reference, an analysis is performed with the design 
requirements of CEC. 
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In the U.S. Army C&C system (Figure 12), the pertinent 
functions that are relevant to CEC are circled in red. The 
army is constantly collecting and disseminating information 
throughout the entire command chain regarding the enemy 
forces and its environment, using Common Operational 
Picture (COP). The COP builds the Army’s SA depending on 
the information reporting process, information transmission 
rate and communications security. The operating systems of 
the army forces must be coherent and interoperable for such 
information transfer. The details of the orders to be 
carried out, transmitted to the units tasked with the 
accomplishment of those orders, is also part of the 
information transfer, and through the OODA analysis, this 
relay of details should be performed at the slightest delay 
to notch time and strategic advantage over the enemy 
forces. 
 
Figure 12.   Information and the C&C System (From: 
Globalsecurity.org, 1997) 
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Figure 13 shows the mapping of capability needs of the 
USN CBG to the design of the CEC components. It is always 
imperative for defense organizations to reduce casualties 
and fatalities to maintain their combat power against high 
kill rate through advancement in technology and military 
tactics. As such, the capability need to achieve the 
objective of reduced casualties and fatalities is to 
increase the survivability of the troops through the design 
requirements of constructing a COP, security in 
communication network with real-time data communication as 
well as automated decision making for fast response. 
Without the design requirements, the capability need would 
be hard to fulfill and thus, affect the design of the CEC 
system. The CEC component is designed specifically to 
perform the requirements stated so as to achieve the 
capability needs. In the case of the capability need to 
increase survivability, the CEC components shown in Figure 
13 were all designed to perform the requirements as 
discussed earlier, to increase survivability. The figure 
also shows other capabilities needs of the USN CBG that map 
to the design of the CEC components.  
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Figure 13.   Mapping capability needs to CEC design 
Although there are similarities in terms of the design 
requirements and functions of the Army C&C systems, there 
are several key differences employed in different operating 
environments such as sea and land. 
B. STUDY OF SEA AND LAND OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS 
There are differences operating in the sea and land 
combat environments. The following segments describe the 
four key differences: (1) environment, (2) threats, (3) 
platform, and (4) reaction time to threats in these 
environments. 
1. Environment 
In the navy combat environment, there are multiple 
terrains with which naval combat ships interact. The naval 
combat forces would need to monitor airspace, sea surface, 
underwater, and land areas for enemies, intelligence, and 
SA. Each of these terrains is unique in its environmental 
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characteristics (e.g., climate, humidity, etc.); as such, 
each requires various sensors and shooter systems to defend 
and attack against particular enemies. In the land combat 
environment, there are thick vegetation and high mountains 
that obscure vision and communications. At the same time, 
the enemy is moving, at times hiding to deny detection, and 
at all times using terrain to gain strategic advantage.  
With modernization and urbanization, the land combat 
environment becomes complex and dynamic with the combat 
zones shifting into cities, towering with high-rise 
buildings that further deny vision and communications, 
widespread use of homes for immediate shelters, covers and 
traps, underground networks and groups of residents that 
may or may not be hostile.  All these expand the complexity 
of the land terrain and combat responsibilities.  
At sea, it is usually uncommon that an enemy aircraft 
will have an innocent civilian sitting in the cockpit while 
the pilot is trying the engage his targets, or civilian 
ships sailing into the middle of air-sea engagements in 
combat zones. But in the land combat environment, it is 
very common for civilians to be situated near the 
engagement, and some might be deliberate (Calkins & Fisk, 
2006). Thus, with the addition of these ambiguous ‘new 
combatants,’ the land combat environment is undeniably 
clouded by a host of unknowns.  
2. Threats 
The threats that navy ships face are torpedoes, anti-
ship ballistic missiles and rockets from various sources. 
They have long endurance and travel at high speeds that are 
challenging to intercept. These missiles cause serious 
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damage to ship’s operations, especially the sophisticated 
sea-skimming missiles that take advantage of the earth’s 
spherical nature as well the “sea clutter” that obstructs 
and disrupts the scanning of such missiles by the ship’s 
radar. Nonetheless, these anti-ships missiles are usually 
individually launched (often two due to high per-unit cost) 
and thus the ships in the USN CBG may be handling small 
quantities of missiles at a time  (Navy.mil, 2009). 
The land combat forces face a variety of threats, 
ranging from bullets and Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs) to rockets fired from a large variety of platforms 
such as rifles, attack helicopters, fighter aircraft and 
indirect weapon systems, in the forms of rockets, artillery 
shells and mortar bombs. The missiles or bombs released by 
attack helicopters and fighter aircraft, like the anti-ship 
missiles, are usually launched in pairs, as these precision 
munitions require less quantity to destroy their targets. 
Similarly, rockets are usually armed with a precision 
module to accurately seek out its target and hence are 
launched in pairs or individually. However, for other forms 
of projectiles such as mortar bombs and artillery shells, 
one can expect about 450 mortar bombs from 120mm mortar 
tubes to ‘pour down’ onto an area within minutes (FAS.org, 
1999). 
This is similar to the scene in the movie 300, in 
which arrows generate an intimidating and terrifying effect 
by raining down upon a group of warriors, who face the 
threat with their shields up and bodies down and under 
(Figure 14).  
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Figure 14.   Raining arrows (From: Snyder, 2007) 
In modern wars, such mass firing of projectiles is 
usually for area targets or stationary targets spread over 
an area, with or without vegetation and cover. Some 
examples of key area targets include tank platoons 
laagering around an enclosed area, C&C headquarters and 
deployed artillery batteries. 
3. Platform 
The platforms vary greatly between the sea and land 
combat environments. At sea, the CBG consists of an 
aircraft carrier and its escorts such as destroyers to 
protect the ‘mother ship’ (Figure 15). Each of these ships 
has sizeable area for storage and equipment such as radar, 
weaponry and C&C, allowing them to perform sets of 
functions such as detection, engagement and commanding of 
the troops.     
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Figure 15.   Carrier battle group (From: Navsource.org, 2010) 
In the case of land combat forces, functions commonly 
require a smaller platform area to hold the equipment. 
Thus, it would be costly to develop a single land unit that 
was big enough to perform multiple functions such as 
detect, engage and command. These functions would need to 
be de-centralized due to the lack of platform availability. 
For example, the Firefinder weapon locating radar 
(Figure 16) requires two trucks to deploy. As such, to 
match the equipment that a ship carries, it would need many 
more trucks, which tactically creates a large signature in 
a cramped combat environment.  
If there is any additional equipment to be installed 
or loaded, the common approach by the land forces would be 
to equip with more vehicles to carry these items; for 
current ships, mounting could simply be done on certain 
areas of the ship to accommodate the new items. 
Furthermore, adjustment can be made for new ships without 
considering the size of the terrain, while for the vehicles 
of land forces, dimensions of the platform are critical to 
ensure that the vehicle is able to overcome difficult 
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terrain such as steep slopes, fit onto mobile bridges and 
through mine clearance lanes, etc. Thus, land forces have 
more difficulty in accommodating new equipment and items 
than the naval forces. 
 
 
Figure 16.   AN/TPQ37 Firefinder weapon locating radar (From: 
Radartutorial.eu, 2006) 
4. Reaction Time to Threats 
Due to the open environment of the sea, the air 
threats are usually launched at a distance to prevent 
counter fire. As such, the ship’s reaction time to the air 
threats is dependent on its radar capabilities such as the 
radar scanning range and ability to filter sea clutter to 
detect sea-skimming missile. The longer the range and the 
more sensitive the radar, the longer the reaction time to 
counter the air threat effectively. 
In the ‘deceptive’ land combat terrain, the air 
threats, in this case mortar bombs, could be launched from 
just hundreds of meters, such as M120 120mm mortars, which 
have a minimum range of 200 meters with the delivery of 60 
bombs in 1 minute (FAS.org, 2000). Thus, the reaction time 
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for the land combat forces is significantly lower than that 
of the ships. In such instances, radars might not be 
relevant or useful due to the meager reaction time. Perhaps 
for longer-range projectiles such as artillery or rockets, 
more reaction time could be vital for the combat forces’ 
survivability. Nonetheless, the length of the reaction time 
is dependent on the land forces’ radar capability and 
information transfer rate.  
5. Anti-Air Capability 
Due to the environment that the naval forces face, 
these ships are usually equipped with anti-air weaponry, 
backed by constant research and development to produce 
better anti-air defense against anti-ship missiles.  Each 
ship in the CBG has at least basic anti-air defense systems 
such as the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System and Sea Sparrow 
(Navy.mil, 2012). However, for the land forces, anti-air 
defense capability tends to reside at brigade level or 
higher. The anti-air defense platforms, including the 
weapon-seeking radar, are usually commanded in a 
centralized role due to scarcity and objective needs of the 
overall mission. Also, the anti-air defense platforms are 
used for area protection or specifically to protect 
important assets. Nonetheless, all troops are trained with 
techniques, such as using personal firearms against low-
flying aircrafts to provide alternate forms of anti-air 





Table 1.   Differences between sea and land combat 
environment 
Characteristics Sea Land 
Environment Open with sea 
clutter 
Compact, cluttered with 
buildings, residents 
Common Threats Long-range sea 
skimming missiles 
Projectiles 
Platform Large platform Limited capacity 
Reaction time 
to threats 







Usually Brigade level 
or higher 
 
The two operating environments have major differences, 
with the land forces operating in a decentralized manner 
with small clusters of units while the naval forces operate 
as a whole in a decentralized manner.  
C. POSSIBLE LAND OPERATIONS EMPLOYING CEC 
With the understanding of the capabilities that CEC is 
able to provide to the naval forces, there are some land 
operations that could employ CEC. 
1. Anti-air Defense Mission 
Similar to the USN CBG, the land forces could use 
CEC’s ability to engage a common air threat efficiently and 
effectively as a group. As discussed, the land forces have 
limited air-defense capability and are usually deployed to 
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protect specific assets or conduct area defense. With CEC, 
the air-defense platforms can be connected to scan further 
and possibly provide early warning, especially against 
long-range weapons systems.  
Airborne radar platforms (such as the E2C Hawkeye) can 
be integrated with land forces to provide early warnings on 
incoming rockets, fighter aircraft, or attack helicopters.  
This information could allow the forces to initiate their 
anti-air defense process earlier. Also, better decision 
could be made to counter these threats. Using the rapid 
distribution of information, CEC may even overcome the 
ineffectiveness of early warning against mortars bombs and 
artillery shells mentioned earlier.  
2. Battlefield Monitoring  
Other than providing early warning using CEC’s ability 
for the rapid distribution of information, attaining higher 
SA of the land forces and the current battle in a larger 
scale could assist commanders to tactically ‘shape’ the 
battlefield with higher certainty.  
It is always hard to plan anything with unknown status 
and predicted forecast of the current status. Updates from 
the battlefield usually arrive through voice 
communications. Clarity, audibility and accuracy of the 
information vary in the confused and chaotic environment. 
In a more modern combat environment, updates come in 
clusters in a small-scale reporting format and dependent on 
data communication rate with manual updates on a common 
operation picture. 
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Thus, if commanders are able to obtain higher 
resolution on the details and progress of the overall 
battles, they can act more decisively and with better 
appreciation of the battle as it currently stands. 
Commanders on the ground are also able to appreciate the 
adjacent battles and make sense of the progress of the 
overall battles. 
Lastly, combining those updates and information into a 
common operating picture allows the entire chain of forces 
to ‘see’ and ‘talk’ with their forces and allies better. 
This potentially reduces delay and confusion in execution. 
3. Integrated Strike Mission 
Using CEC’s ability to generate a real-time, precise, 
accurate and identical picture of the air threats as well 
as its effectiveness and efficiency in group combat, strike 
missions (which are usually executed at division (DIV) 
level or higher) can be orchestrated to support smaller 
combat units such as battalions or even companies. This 
concept is part of the Joint Vision 2010 (DOTE&E, 1999) to 




Figure 17.   Joint Strike Battlefield operational concept 
(From: Cohen, 1999) 
Integrated Strike missions usually involve air-land 
platforms, which might not share the same operating 
picture. As such, useful information such as air threats 
(fighter aircraft and attack helicopters) may not be shared 
across these combat services. 
From these three land operations, CEC would be more 
relevant and add higher value to the land anti-air defense 
capability where there are substantial capability gaps (due 
to the scarcity of the anti-air systems) to collectively 
and effectively counter air threats. Also the air threats, 
especially the projectiles, are deadly and cause potential 
mission failures. 
Figure 18 shows the operational concept employing CEC 
on the anti-air defense of a DIV battlefield, with three 




Figure 18.   Operational concept for anti-air defense 
An incoming enemy missile is detected by one of the 
BDE Weapon Locating Radar (TPQ). The information regarding 
this missile is relayed to the BDE Headquarters (HQ), who 
then relayed the information to the DIV HQ for broadcasting 
to other BDE HQs as well as relevant units such as the 
targeted DIV’s High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
(HIMARS), which was analyzed by the BDE TPQ.  The targeted 
HIMARS could then execute evasion drills to move out of the 
impact area. The TPQ and anti-air unit of the leftmost BDE 
is within range of the enemy incoming missile and thus 
initiates execution drills with the anti-air rounds to 
destroy the incoming missiles. The DIV HQ will then prepare 
its own anti-air unit to destroy the incoming missiles as 
well as the other HIMARS unit to counter fire on the enemy, 
if necessary. 
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With this concept, analysis on the employment of CEC 
on anti-air defense system is conducted to provide deeper 
understanding of its feasibility and ability to leverage 



















IV. SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 
A. SIMULATION 
In order to test the concept of CEC on land systems, 
which may require a division’s worth of assets, a large 
amount of cost needs to be budgeted for this logistically, 
time- and labor-intensive experiment. Thus, a modern, 
effective and cost-efficient testing method known as 
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) will be used. M&S is able to 
provide a better resolution of the model that is tested, 
conducting more in-depth analysis of the scenarios and 
thereby producing more accurate results of the simulation.  
Other than using M&S, computation methods such as Back 
of Envelope (BOE) will be used to obtain first cut data of 
the CEC land systems analysis. This will provide a quick 
forecast of the possible scenario outcome before a detailed 
time-based simulation. Design of Experiments (DOE) using 
the Taguchi method will be used to reduce the combination 
of parameters executed in ExtendSim for a detailed time-
based simulation. 
B. MODEL DESIGN 
1. Overview 
For this analysis, the model will simulate incoming 
air threats (mortar bombs, artillery shells and rockets) 
fired at various velocities and ranges with land-based DIV 
air defense system (TPQ and anti-air weapons) to detect and 
counter these threats. In the midst of detecting and 
countering these threats, parameters will be varied during 
the M&S depending on the results from the BOE. Tentatively, 
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four parameters will be analyzed to represent the effects 
of the implementation of CEC into the land systems during 
the M&S. They are the: (1) rate of information transfer 
(process time) between the TPQ and anti-air weapon, (2) 
number of air threats that the anti-air system (one for 
current system and three for CEC land system) is engaging 
at one time, (3) detection range, and (4) maximum anti-air 
engagement range. Lastly, the metrics for this model are 
the number of air threats that are intercepted as well as 
those that successfully evaded the anti-air defense system. 
2. Assumptions 
The following assumptions and initial conditions were 
used in the simulation: 
 
Table 2.   Specification of air threats 








315 5.6 60 




1,600 40 2 
 
The air threats listed in the table above are used due 
to their common employment by land forces. These air 
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threats, with the proposed projectiles, are assumed to be 
capable of destroying a land target.  
The air defense system consists of TPQ and anti-air 
system with the following specifications: 
• TPQ: The TPQ is assumed to have a detection range 
of 40km with apogee ratio of 0.4. 
• Anti-air system: The anti-air system is assumed 
to have a rate of fire of 60 rounds per second, 
muzzle velocity of 1,110 meters per second, 
probability of intercept of 0.2, maximum and 
minimum engagement range of 10 kilometers and 500 
meters, respectively. 
• The rate of information transfer between the TPQ 
and anti-air system will be termed as process 
time in this simulation, with a default time of 4 
seconds. 
The values of the parameters above are defined as the 
default values of the M&S model. 
C. SIMULATION TOOLS 
1. BOE 
Using Excel as the platform to conduct BOE, 
mathematical computation using the parameters listed in the 
earlier assumptions allows the first cut data to be 
obtained. In order to compute the metrics, there are five 
parameters to be calculated: (1) duration before impact, 
(2) duration from detect to impact, (3) duration from 
engagement to impact, (4) duration of engagement and 
lastly, (5) total anti-air munitions. The formulas as well 
as a snapshot of the BOE model are listed in the Appendix. 
The result from the computation of the anti-air 
munitions will be used in the computation of the metrics. 
With the probability of intercepting of the incoming air 
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threats by the anti-air munitions, CRITBINOM function1 will 
be used to examine the number of intercepted incoming air 
threats with each anti-air munition as an independent 
Bernoulli trial.  
To extend the computation results, data are tabulated 
to analyze the effects of maximum anti-air engagement range 
as well as process time on the number of un-intercepted 
incoming air threats. The results in the data table are 
calculated and averaged through 10,000 runs. 
2. DOE 
DOE using Taguchi method was conducted during the 
ExtendSim simulation to identify the parameters that will 
have the greatest impact on the effectiveness of the air-
defense capability. The parameters that are relevant to CEC 
land system and are tested are dependent on results of the 
BOE. 
The Taguchi method can efficiently conduct experiments 
through calculation of combinations of certain value levels 
of parameters, instead of executing every possible 
combination during the simulation, which can be time 
consuming. A simulation with four control variables with 
four levels would take 44 or 256 combinations but using 
Taguchi methodology, it would take just 16 combinations. 
                     
1 The CRITBINOM(n, p, alpha) function examines for various x the 
cumulative probability of x successes in n independent Bernoulli 
trials. Each trial has the associated probability p of success. 
CRITBINOM returns the smallest value of x for which this cumulative 
probability is greater than or equal to alpha.  
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3. ExtendSim 
The model shown in Figure 19 will be used for the M&S 
to simulate the CEC land system’s operational environment. 
For the first three simulation runs, a baseline model with 
the default parameters values listed in Chapter IV, Section 
B2 will be simulated. Each simulation run consists of 100 
trials, taking the average as the final results. For the 
subsequent simulation runs, the parameters will be based on 
values obtained from DOE.  
 
 
Figure 19.   ExtendSim model 
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The model comprises four parts, sequentially from top 
to bottom in Figure 19: (1) initialization of data (red 
box), (2) computation to ensure incoming air threats are 
within anti-air engagement window (blue box), (3) 
computation on whether the incoming air threats are 
engaged, leaked due to insufficient anti-air weapons, 
passing of the engagement window or simply inability to 
intercept the incoming air threats (orange box), and lastly 
(4) consolidation of the data (green box). 
For the initialization of the incoming air threats, 
the rate of fire varies due to different firing rates by 
different weapon. Also, it is assumed that the firing of 
the incoming threats would display a normal distribution 
with the mean and standard deviation (SD), as shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 3.   Values used for ExtendSim M&S 
Incoming Threats Firing Rate Per 
Firing Unit 




Mortar Bomb 16rds/min 4rds/4sec 0, 1 
Artillery Shell 3rds/min 6rds/20sec 0, 2 
Rockets 12rds/30sec 2rds/sec 0, 0 
 
Process time and detection range are computed within 
the blue box, while concurrent anti-air targets and maximum 
anti-air engagement range are computed within the orange 
box. The database in the model captures all the parameters 
to be tested as well as the results that were to be 
analyzed. 
 41 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. BOE 
The BOE is computed with the default values listed in 
Table 3 for the three different incoming air threats, with 
the results consolidated in Table 4. 
 












5.6km 60 160 30 30 
Artillery 
Shells 
10km 60 0 0 60 
Rockets 40km 2 108 2 0 
 
Through the summarized results, it can be seen that 
the implementation of CEC would be more effective in anti-
air defense systems against artillery shells and mortar 
bombs. The default values for the anti-air defense system 
against rockets generate an ideal result with 100% 
interception of the air threat.  
The following segments cover the BOE experimentation 
and results in detail for each type of air threat. 
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1. Mortar Bombs 
Figure 19 shows the range trajectory of the incoming 
mortar shells on the target. It is noted that the anti-air 
system has a short engagement window of about 3.11 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 20.   Range target for incoming mortar bombs 
Within 17.78 seconds, during which 60 mortar bombs 
will land on the target, a total of 160 anti-air munitions 
are expected to intercept these incoming air threats. With 
the intercept probability of 0.2 and a ratio of about three 
anti-air munitions to one incoming mortar bomb, about 30 of 
the 60 mortar bombs are expected to leak through the air 
defense system. 
With various process time and maximum effective range 























Table 5 are obtained and averaged from 10,000 runs. From 
the data table, process time has more influence on the 
number of leakers than the engagement range. It can be seen 
that if the process time is greater than 6.5 seconds, all 
of the 60 mortar bombs will leak past the air-defense 
system regardless of the engagement range of the anti-air 
weapon.  This is due to the short engagement window that 
the anti-air weapon would have from the short engagement 
range of the mortar. However, it is also noted that with a 
configuration of process time and maximum effective 
engagement range of 0.5 seconds and at least 2.5km, 
respectively, or 1 second and at least 4.0km, respectively, 
a 100% interception of the 60 artillery shells can be 
achieved.  
 
Table 5.   Effects of process time and maximum effective 
anti-air engagement range on mortar bombs leakers 
    Process Time (s) 




1.0 33 39 45 51 57 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
1.5 14 20 27 32 38 44 50 56 60 60 60 60 60 60 
2.0 1 3 8 14 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 60 60 60 
2.5 0 1 2 5 10 16 22 28 34 40 46 52 58 60 
3.0 0 1 2 5 10 16 22 28 34 40 46 52 58 60 
3.5 0 1 2 5 10 16 22 28 34 40 46 52 58 60 
4.0 0 0 2 5 10 16 22 28 34 40 46 52 58 60 
 
2. Artillery Shells 
From Figure 21, there is almost a nil anti-air 




Figure 21.   Range target for incoming artillery shells 
Thus, at the current fired range of 10km and with 
almost no anti-air munitions to intercept the incoming 
artillery shells, the anti-air defense system is 
ineffective at such ranges or shorter. 
With the formulation of the data in Table 6, it is 
noted that the process time has a close relationship with 
maximum effective range up to 3.5 seconds and 4km, 
respectively. Beyond this combination, all of the 60 
artillery shells will leak past the anti-air defense 
system. However, even with a process time of 0.5 seconds 
and a maximum engagement range of 4km or more, the anti-air 
defense system could only manage to intercept at most 66.6% 
or 40 of the 60 of the incoming artillery shells, due to 























Table 6.   Effects of process time and maximum effective 
anti-air engagement range on artillery shells 
leakers 
  
Process Time (s) 
  




1 59 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
1.5 52 58 60 60 60 60 60 60 
2 46 52 58 60 60 60 60 60 
2.5 39 45 51 57 60 60 60 60 
3 33 39 45 51 57 60 60 60 
3.5 26 32 38 44 50 56 60 60 
4 20 26 32 38 44 50 56 60 
4.5 20 26 32 38 44 50 56 60 
 
3. Rockets 
As shown in Figure 22, the air-defense system is able 
to detect the incoming rockets 10 seconds before a target 
is hit. However, due to the limited anti-air engagement 
range of 10km, the engagement window is limited to 1.8 
seconds. 
 


























With the engagement window, a total of 108 anti-air 
munitions are computed to successfully engage the two 
incoming rockets. The success engagement is due to the 
large number of trials (anti-air munitions) against the low 
number of air threats (two rockets) or a ratio of 54:1. 
With the formulation of Table 7, it is noted that both 
process time and maximum engagement range up to 9.5 seconds 
and 16km, respectively, have strong relationship to the 
number of rocket leakers. With the existing assumption of 
10km of maximum engagement range, the anti-air defense 
system is able to accommodate a less stringent process time 
of 5 seconds to achieve a 100% interception of the two 
incoming rockets.  
 
Table 7.   Effects of process time and maximum effective 
anti-air engagement range on rockets leakers 
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4. Effects of Process Time and Fired Range 
In another BOE computation, it is noted that the 
duration of the process time as well as the fired range of 
the air threats affects the anti-air engagement window of 
air-defense window.  
With a minimum process time of 10.5 seconds and 6 
seconds for intercepting 60 artillery shells and two 
rockets, respectively, from any range, the anti-air defense 
system will be rendered ineffective due to the long 
duration of process time. For process time below the values 
shown in Table 8, the number of intercepted air threats 
will be dependent on the fired range; however, the values 
must be beyond 0.5km, 1.5km and 2.5km for mortar bombs, 
artillery shells and rockets, respectively. 
 
Table 8.   Effects of process time and fired range of air 
threats on anti-air defense system 
Air Threats Fired Range (km) Process Time (s) 
Mortar Bombs 0.5 - 
Artillery Shells - 10.5 
Rockets - 6 
 
However, for the interception of all the 60 mortar 
bombs, the values of fired range and process time that will 
render the anti-air system ineffective varies and it is 
only at a fired range of 0.5km (regardless of the process 
time) that the anti-air defense system will be rendered 
ineffective due to a short detection window. 
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B. DOE 
Through the results of the BOE, it is concluded that 
(1) fired range of the air threats, (2) maximum engagement 
range, and (3) process time have great impact on the number 
of incoming air threats that will penetrate the air 
defense. In addition to testing of the CEC implementation 
on land systems, the (4) number of concurrent air targets 
that the anti-air weapon system can engage at any time is 
also considered to be relevant for the DOE.  
However, it is also noted that through these BOE 
results, rockets will not be tested in the M&S (except 
using default values), due to the unlikelihood in combat 
operations that the quantity, fired range of the rocket and 
maximum anti-air engagement range would be more than 2, 
less than 40km, and less than 16km, respectively for a land 
target. Also, although the detection range tested during 
the BOE is larger than the fired range of the incoming air 
threats, except rockets, this parameter will be tested in 
the M&S as part of the CEC employment.  
1. Taguchi Design 
Based on the results of the BOE, a DOE (with four 
factors, four levels, and two noise factors) is computed 
for various values of the parameters to be simulated. The 
values of the four levels of each control variable are 





Table 9.   Four level values of the control parameters for 
DOE 




10 20 40 60 It is assumed that the maximum 
detection range could be increased 




5 10 20 40 It is assumed that the maximum 
engagement range could be 
increased to 40km through CEC 
Process 
Time (s) 
1 4 7 10 Process Time of 1 sec assumes 
almost instantaneous information 




1 3 6 9 It is assumed that there could be 
nine anti-air targets that could 
be engaged through CEC 
 
The values of the higher and lower limits are 
estimated to be possible through the implementation of CEC. 
As such, the maximum engagement range of the anti-air 
system is assumed to increase to 40km as each of the DIV 
anti-air weapons is integrated with one another. With these 
values of the four levels of the control parameters formed, 
the values of these parameters used in the reduced 
simulation runs can be generated through Taguchi DOE, as 




Table 10.   Taguchi four control factors four levels design 










1 10 5 1 1 
2 10 10 4 3 
3 10 20 7 6 
4 10 40 10 9 
5 20 5 4 6 
6 20 10 1 9 
7 20 20 10 1 
8 20 40 7 3 
9 40 5 7 9 
10 40 10 10 6 
11 40 20 1 3 
12 40 40 4 1 
13 60 5 10 3 
14 60 10 7 1 
15 60 20 4 9 
16 60 40 1 6 
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Also, two noise factors and two levels are also 
tabulated to simulate the possible fired range and rate of 
fire of the mortar bombs and artillery shells (Table 11). 
Table 11.   Taguchi two noise factors two levels design 
 Noise Factors 
Response 
Variables 
Fired Range (km) 
(Mortar/Artillery) 
Rate of Fire 
(Mortar/Artillery) 
Y1 1/5 (4rds/4sec)/(6rds/20sec) 
Y2 1/5 (4rds/2sec)/(6rds/10sec) 
Y3 2.5/10 (4rds/4sec)/(6rds/20sec) 
Y4 2.5/10 (4rds/2sec)/(6rds/10sec) 
Y5 4/15 (4rds/4sec)/(6rds/20sec) 
Y6 4/15 (4rds/2sec)/(6rds/10sec) 
Y7 6/20 (4rds/4sec)/(6rds/20sec) 
Y8 6/20 (4rds/2sec)/(6rds/10sec) 
Y9 7.5/40 (4rds/4sec)/(6rds/20sec) 
Y10 7.5/40 (4rds/2sec)/(6rds/10sec) 
 
With 10 permutations from the two noise factors two 
level Taguchi design, a total of 160 simulation runs each 
for the mortar bombs and artillery shells were performed in 




Results from M&S using the default values for the 
anti-air defense system against the incoming air threats 
are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12.   M&S results using default values 
Air Threats Intercepted Leakers 
Mortar Bombs from 5.6km 60 0 
Artillery Shells from 15km 8	   52	  
Rockets from 40km 2	   0	  
 
Interestingly, the M&S results shown that mortar bombs 
were all intercepted, whereas the interception result of 
the rockets was expected based on BOE. The number of 
artillery shells intercepted was increased slightly, 
compared to the BOE results where there was nil 
interception. This increase was due to the intervals 
(normal distribution) of the incoming artillery shells. 
D. ANALYSIS OF TAGUCHI DESIGN 
With the ExtendSim results from the 160 simulation 
runs each for mortar bombs and artillery shells, Taguchi 
analysis using Minitab was performed to provide more 
insights on the effects of the control and noise 
parameters.  
1. Mortar Bombs 
From the Taguchi analysis, rankings of the influence 
of the control variables on the number of intercepted 
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mortar bombs was generated. Process time was the most 
influential control variable, followed by maximum 
engagement range, detection range and, lastly, number of 
concurrent air targets.  
From the mean plot of the intercepted mortar bombs 
shown in Figure 23, it can be seen that lower process time 
increases the number of mortar bombs intercepted. However, 
there are no changes to the interception of the mortar 
bombs by the other three parameters: (1) detection range, 




Figure 23.   Mean of mortar bombs intercepted 
From the Signal to Noise (S/N) ratio plot shown in 
Figure 24, it can be seen that a process time of 10 seconds 
has a high S/N. However, based on the mean plot in Figure 
23, it would result in a decrease of intercepted mortar 
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bombs. Similar to the analysis of the mean, the remaining 
three control variables have insignificant influence on the 
number of intercepted mortar bombs. As such, the ideal 
setting to achieve the highest number of intercepted mortar 
bombs is a process time of 1 second with any other 
combination of the remaining three control variables. It 
was predicted using Taguchi analysis that this 
configuration would intercept about 50 mortar bombs. 
 
 
Figure 24.   S/N Ratio of mortar bombs intercepted 
2. Artillery Shells 
From the Taguchi analysis, rankings of the influence 
of the control variables on the number of intercepted 
artillery shells were generated. Process time was the most 
influential control variable, followed by number of 
concurrent air targets, maximum engagement range and, 
lastly, detection range. 
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From the M&S results (Figure 25), it can be seen that 
the process time is the most significant factor to 
influence the number of intercepted artillery shells. 
Despite the minor fluctuation on the number of intercepted 
artillery shells for the remaining three control variables, 
there are some observations that are distinctive from the 
mean plot. It is seen that a detection range beyond 40km 
does not affect the number of intercepted artillery shells 
as the maximum fired range of the artillery shells 
simulated was 40km. The maximum engagement range of 5km and 
40km as well as the capability to engage nine concurrent 
targets yield the highest number of intercepted artillery 
shells within their respective parameters. 
 
 
Figure 25.   Mean of artillery shells intercepted 
The S/N ratio plot shown in Figure 26 clearly 
indicates that process time of 1 second is the ideal and 
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influential value to increase the number of intercepted 
artillery rounds. Thus, the ideal setting to achieve the 
highest number of intercepted mortar bombs is to use a 
process time of 1 second with 40km detection range, 5km 
engagement range and capability to engage nine concurrent 
air targets. It was predicted using Taguchi analysis that 
this configuration would intercept about 67 artillery 
shells. However, as the maximum number of artillery shells 
tested was 60, it is noted that the predicted value of 67 
artillery shells is the maximum number of intercepted 
shells for the configuration used for prediction. 
 
 
Figure 26.   S/N ratio of artillery shells intercepted 
E. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
From the simulation results, it is noted that process 
time is key to the success rate of intercepting incoming 
air threats. However, process time refers to the rate of 
information transfer (process time) between the TPQ and 
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anti-air weapon. This includes the data processing at the 
TPQ, analysis by the TPQ commander, data transfer (either 
wired or wireless) between the TPQ and anti-air weapon, 
decision making by the DIV/BDE commander and execution by 
the anti-air weapon commander.  The process time utilized 
by these various commanders includes the decision time, 
dead time, time constant and information delay time. Thus, 
the process time of 1 second to accomplish these tasks 
would seem infeasible but, perhaps, the process time of 1 
second could be achieved through automation, including the 
decision-making process of the TPQ commander, DIV/BDE 
commander and anti-air weapon commander. 
Other factors such as detection range, maximum 
engagement range and number of concurrent targets to be 
engaged were determined to have little influence on the 
interception rate of the incoming air threats. Nonetheless, 
the interception rate of the incoming air threats is also 
highly dependent on the rate of fire and range of the air 
threats. In this M&S simulation, the rate of fire (one of 
the noise factors) is limited to two levels, with the 
quantity of the air threats fixed at 60 rounds. As such, 
the anti-air defense system is technically engaging two 
incoming air threats per second, which provides substantial 
engagement window for a successful interception based on 
the rate of fire of the anti-air defense weapon. Unlike the 
BOE computation, all of the 60 incoming air threats (for 
mortar bombs and artillery shells) are computed to be 
engaged by the anti-air weapon in a single salvo, which may 
or may not be realistic due to the scale of resources that 
are to be committed and the returns by destroying the 
target. 
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Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the interception 
rate of rockets is high due to the long firing range, which 
increases the anti-air engagement window and small quantity 
of the rockets fired upon a target. Air threats from 
artillery and mortar fire pose potential threats to the 
land targets and limit the anti-air engagement window. 
Mortar bombs are observed to be the most dangerous threat 
through the Taguchi analysis, as it was predicted that the 
maximum mortar bombs intercepted is 50 out of 60 or 83% of 




A. BENEFITS OF CEC FOR LAND COMBAT FORCES 
Through the M&S results, land combat forces employing 
CEC could achieve a higher interception rate of air threats 
during anti-air defense operations. It was observed that 
process time is the key factor to increase interception 
rate of incoming air threats. Real-time information 
transfers and establishing common combat picture, which are 
benefits of CEC, could potentially reduce process time.  
However, not all of the capabilities of CEC are 
relevant and useful for the land combat forces. Increasing 
track accuracy may not be beneficial to the land combat 
forces due to time taken to track a common target within a 
short anti-air engagement window and also the high ratio of 
anti-air munitions against the air threats. Due to the 
range of the incoming air threats, there are no additional 
benefits to pooling radar resources in order to extend 
detection coverage, thus reducing the need to pool the 
radar resources. 
Consideration of the number of air threats as well as 
the concurrent air threats that are being tracked and 
engaged must further be analyzed due to the possibility of 
large quantities of cheap munitions firing on a land 
target. With multiple threats within a short time frame 
(such as 60 air threats, in this case), a CEC network would 
be highly utilized with a large flow of data traffic within 
seconds in order to share threat data and information, 
potentially resulting in bandwidth scarcity. Thus, with the 
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initialization and utilization of the CEC network control 
unit, the process time could be reduced drastically. 
Reducing OODA loop delays such as decision time, dead 
time, time constant and information delay time would also 
help in reducing process time. With more stakeholders 
within the anti-air defense system, establishing preplanned 
engagement authorization and doctrines could potentially 
shorten OODA loop delays, thus further narrowing the areas 
to conduct optimization research and analysis. 
Therefore, land combat forces can employ CEC to 
increase SA among the troops, increase interception rate 
and reduce process time.  However, the implementation of 
CEC on land systems cannot be taken wholesale from the CEC 
structure used in the USN, due to the differences in 
threats, nature of operations, platforms and cost of CEC 
equipment and implementation. Thus, it is recommended to 
implement relevant functions of CEC by focusing on 
improvising the network connectivity structure and rapid 
data processing rate of CEC to suit the needs of the land 
combat forces. The needs of the land combat forces include 
the reduction of process time, increased interception rate 
of the incoming air threats and, lastly, reduction of cost. 
Exploration on doctrinal changes to reduce OODA loop delay 
time should also be analyzed further. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Due to the scope of this thesis, a number of 
applicable areas in which further research and analysis are 
recommended are listed below. 
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1) Determine the maximum allowable process time 
utilized by each of the stakeholders in the 
anti-air defense system to achieve optimal 
interception rate. 
2) Conduct more in-depth analysis of the incoming 
air threats on various land targets with 
characteristics such as radar cross section, 
quantity, area and probability of kill for 
each target to determine the Returns of 
Investment in terms of survivability. 
3) Apply the concept of CEC on large-scale combat 
systems such as air-land strike integration 
and determine the effectiveness against 
current methodology.  
4) Conduct analysis to achieve the capability of 











Duration before impact = Fired range/Incoming threat 
muzzle velocity 
Duration from detect to impact = Minimum(Radar 
detection range*Apogee)/Incoming threat muzzle velocity, 
Fired range*Apogee/Incoming threat muzzle velocity) 
Duration from engagement to Impact = Minimum(Max 
effective anti-air engagement range/Incoming threat muzzle 
velocity – process time, Duration from detect to impact – 
process time) 
Duration of engagement = Duration from engagement to 
impact – (Min effective anti-air engagement range/anti-air 
muzzle velocity) 
Total anti-air munitions = duration of engagement * 
anti-air fire rate 
Intercepted = Minimum(No of inbound, Critbinom(total 
anti-air munitions, P(intercept), rand()) 




















Incoming Air Threat 
 
Total Anti Air Munitions 159.64 
Number of inbound Shell 60 
 
Intercepted 37 
Max Range (km) 7.2 
 
Leakers 23 
Fired Range (km) 5.6 
 
    
Muzzle Velocity (m/s) 315 
 
Timings 
    
 
Duration before impact (s) 17.78 
Radar 
 
Duration From Detect to Impact (s) 7.11 
Effective Detection Range (km) 40 
 
Duration from Launch to Impact (s) 3.11 
Apogee Ratio 0.4 
 
Duration of Launch (s) 2.66 
    
   Anti-Air 
   Rate of Fire (rd/s) 60 
   Muzzle Velocity (m/s) 1110 
   Max Effective Range (m) 10000 
   Min Effective Range (m) 500 
   Process time for 1st launch (s) 4 
   P(Intercept) 0.2 
   Figure 27.   Snapshot of BOE computation model 
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